Justice infinie

Justice infinie was the initial name for the Bush administration’s campaign against terrorism, but in Noam Chomsky’s account it quickly became more than a label: its promise of boundless justice sharpened the contrast between official rhetoric and the human consequences of the air campaign in Afghanistan. The name was abandoned after officials recognized its propaganda costs, yet its replacement did not answer the questions the original expression raised about civilian suffering, international law, and the purposes of military power.

Naming the campaign

The administration first used “crusade” for its response to the September 11 attacks, then changed course after being warned that the word would make it much harder to rally allies in the Islamic world. “War” became the chosen term. The campaign’s initial name, Justice infinie, carried a different problem: Chomsky notes that it seemed to place the United States in the position of the divine. Government communications specialists recognized the risk, and the name was replaced with “Enduring Freedom.” In the book’s account, the change is evidence of political messaging adapting to its audience; it does not itself settle whether the campaign’s actions were just or lawful.

The naming question belongs to Chomsky’s wider scrutiny of the language used to present military force. He contrasts the willingness to call the 1991 Gulf conflict a war with the description of the bombing of Serbia as “humanitarian intervention,” and argues that declarations of humanitarian purpose cannot establish humanitarian intent by themselves. In that context, Justice infinie is not simply an unfortunate choice of words. Its grand claim invites comparison with the outcomes against which that claim must be judged.

The humanitarian contradiction

Chomsky places the name against the approaching famine in Afghanistan. The United Nations estimated that seven to eight million people could soon face starvation; roughly six million Afghans depended on food distributed by the United Nations. Air strikes beginning on October 7 interrupted the World Food Programme’s convoys and local food distributions. Hundreds of tonnes of food had been sent toward Afghanistan in early October, but the programme estimated that this would meet no more than 15 percent of the country’s needs. Relief organizations criticized the publicity around American food drops while bombing had disrupted the truck deliveries they considered the effective means of transporting large quantities of food.

Against those circumstances, Chomsky invokes writer and activist Arundhati Roy’s description of the operation: “Civilians dying of hunger while waiting to be killed.” Her words give the expression Justice infinie its most severe counter-image: not an abstract contest over a campaign name, but civilians facing hunger amid military action. Chomsky says the judgment retained its force after the administration replaced the name. “Enduring Freedom,” he argues, could likewise be set against the historical record, rather than accepted as proof of the policy’s humanitarian character.

The argument also distinguishes material consequences from public-relations gestures. Chomsky describes the interruption of food aid as a consequence of the air strikes, while reporting that the United States and Britain later spoke of providing food to avert famine. He questions whether such efforts reflected a response to public criticism or an attempt to improve the campaign’s image. His account notes the government’s stated humanitarian rationale alongside another proposed benefit: food aid might help win support for the pursuit of terrorist networks. The name’s moral promise thus sits within a dispute about both consequences and political purpose.

Law, evidence, and the use of force

Chomsky’s criticism of Justice infinie is part of an argument that counterterrorism should proceed through evidence, arrest, and trial rather than punishment through bombing. He says international legal institutions could support efforts to arrest and try Osama bin Laden and his associates, including the use of force, if their guilt were demonstrated. He reports that much of the world called on the United States to provide evidence of bin Laden’s involvement and argues that an international operation under United Nations auspices could have gained support. The Taliban had indicated possible diplomatic means of addressing the matter, Chomsky says, but those proposals were rejected and force was preferred.

He also invokes the United Nations Charter’s restriction on the use of force: force is permitted in self-defense against an armed attack, or through action by the Security Council to preserve international peace and security. In this account, retaliation is prohibited, and Chomsky argues that the United States was not under armed attack in the sense required by Article 51. The legal case is linked to his demand for consistent standards: the rules applied to adversaries should also apply to the United States.

As precedent, Chomsky recalls the International Court of Justice ruling against the United States over its actions in Nicaragua. The court ordered the United States to cease its actions and pay substantial reparations; the United States rejected the ruling and intensified its attacks. Chomsky presents Nicaragua’s recourse to the court and the United Nations as the kind of legal process available to states confronting violence. The comparison makes the phrase Justice infinie part of a larger challenge: whether a government claiming to pursue justice will accept legal institutions and standards when they constrain its own power.

Strategic consequences

Chomsky argues that the war in Afghanistan also offered the United States an opportunity to expand its military position. He identifies the establishment of major American military bases in Central Asia as a significant consequence, linking them to access to the region’s resources and to a wider network of bases directed toward the Persian Gulf. Before the war, he says, Diego Garcia had been the most secure base for that system; the new Central Asian presence made intervention easier if the United States considered it appropriate.

He interprets the campaign as part of an effort to consolidate American military superiority and demonstrate what could happen to states that failed to follow the rules set by the United States. In support of this reading, he compares the bombing of Afghanistan with NATO’s bombing of Serbia, which, he says, had been justified by the need to establish the alliance’s credibility. Justice infinie therefore stands in tension not only with the humanitarian emergency but also with the strategic explanation Chomsky advances: the language of universal justice frames a campaign whose consequences and purposes, in his analysis, must be assessed through its effects and its exercise of power.